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NO. 47 OCTOBER 2020 Introduction 
Upholding the World Health Organization 
Next Steps for the EU 
Susan Bergner, Remco van de Pas, Louise van Schaik and Maike Voss 
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, the European Union (EU) was neither a strong pro-
moter of global health nor a strong supporter of the World Health Organization 
(WHO). The Global Health Council Conclusions from 2010 were never comprehensively 
implemented and quickly forgotten. With the pandemic greatly affecting EU member 
states, the EU is increasingly interested in upholding multilateral cooperation in the 
global health field. Therefore, the EU should aim for an upgrading of the EU’s status 
in WHO, the establishment of a global health unit in the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), and an overhaul of the formal relationship between the European 
Commission and WHO. 
 
The pandemic discloses the discrepancy 
between the EU advocating for global access 
to a COVID-19 vaccine while at the same 
time safeguarding its own access to it. Its 
refusal to alter patent laws that serve to 
protect the commercial and innovation in-
terests of pharmaceutical companies based 
in EU countries can equally be questioned 
on grounds of global solidarity. A revamped 
global health strategy is needed to over-
come such issues and make the EU a reli-
able and capable partner on global health 
that gives WHO a central role. 
Global Health Policy Undervalued 
As public health policy-making remains 
mainly a national competence under Euro-
pean legislation, the EU can coordinate and 
complement the policies of member states. 
The Union’s global health policy-making 
lacked visibility in recent decades, although 
the EU is traditionally a promoter of effec-
tive multilateralism. With its Council Con-
clusions on global health, adopted in 2010, 
the EU committed itself to stronger global 
health governance – including support-
ing WHO and the United Nations (UN) sys-
tem – focusing on Universal Health Cover-
age, strengthening health systems, as well 
as recognising the need for a “Health in All 
Policies” approach, including in the EU’s 
external actions. However, the Conclusions 
never received the strong backing of health, 
development, and foreign ministries of EU 
member states, as the EU was primarily 
seen as a development actor rather than a 
strategic agent in global health. Thus, EU 
member states decided in an incoherent 
way on how large a budget that they and 
the European Commission would make 
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available for international health priorities, 
initiatives, and institutions such as WHO. 
Before the COVID-19 pandemic, global 
health was not a priority on the European 
political agenda, and both the health and 
international development cooperation 
mandate was reclaimed by EU member 
states; with some exceptions being issues 
in fashion, such as anti-microbial resist-
ance and digital health. 
COVID-19: The EU’s Wake-up Call 
to Global Health? 
The EU has been struggling to respond to 
the COVID-19 pandemic, as member states 
primarily followed a national response at 
the beginning. European and international 
cooperation were initially placed on the 
back burner with the introduction of ex-
port restrictions on protective equipment 
such as masks and gloves. Aside from the 
reluctance of member states to cooperate, 
the lack of resources and authority of the 
European Centre for Disease Prevention 
and Control (ECDC) has hampered a har-
monised, evidence-based approach with-
in Europe, and it has impeded the ECDC 
from proactively engaging in global health 
policies. 
Gradually, a more “Europeanised” effort 
is now evolving to shore up the effective-
ness of Europe’s public health response 
within the EU as well as in its multilateral 
commitments to bolster global health. Euro-
pean governments have started to realise 
that a joint approach is necessary to recover 
from the pandemic and the socio-economic 
crises that will follow. In her State of the 
Union address, Commission President Ursula 
von der Leyen called for a European Health 
Union. She announced plans to bolster the 
ECDC and the European Medicines Agency. 
An expansion of EU competence in the field 
of health is to be discussed in the Confer-
ence on the Future of Europe, which the 
European Commission will organise in 2021. 
She also announced the establishment of a 
European Biomedical Advanced Research 
and Development Authority (EU BARDA) to 
enhance Europe’s capacity to respond to 
cross-border threats. 
Unfortunately, it is not clear if EU mem-
ber states also support these ambitions. A 
proposal for the EU health budget (2021–
2027) to be increased to 25 times its current 
size was largely undone by member states 
deciding to reduce the overall amount of the 
EU budget. A strong European investment 
in health systems and monitoring would 
have made global EU efforts in supporting 
the resilience of health systems and crisis 
preparedness more credible. Budgetary lines 
for global health policies for international 
cooperation have not been introduced or 
bolstered yet, which makes the future financ-
ing of ambitious EU global health policies 
in the upcoming EU budget challenging. 
The Commission and EU member states 
were more united in February 2020, when 
they decided to uphold the international 
health order by activating financial support 
for WHO early on. During the pandemic, 
WHO has moved to the centre of infor-
mation provision regarding the spread of 
the disease and the required public health 
responses. After harshly attacking WHO 
and accusing the organisation of being 
too China-friendly, the US administration 
announced in July 2020 that it would be 
pulling out of WHO. There are now in-
creased expectations for the EU to fill finan-
cial as well as leadership gaps. EU member 
states such as Germany and France have 
already stepped in, with the former pledg-
ing an unprecedented €500 million to WHO 
for 2020. France has committed an addi-
tional €50 million to WHO as well as a €90 
million commitment towards founding a 
new WHO Academy. 
Formal EU and WHO Cooperation 
The relationship between WHO and the EU 
is based on an exchange of letters dating 
back to 1972. The EU–WHO cooperation 
is modelled on the work done by WHO and 
the EU on the global, regional, and national 
levels. Firstly, the EU and WHO Headquar-
ters in Geneva interact through designated 
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staff in the EU delegation and via Senior Of-
ficial Meetings. Both are mostly concerned 
with global issues. Secondly, the European 
Commission as well as the ECDC have a prac-
tical partnership with the WHO Regional 
Office for Europe (WHO EURO) in Copen-
hagen, which is primarily focused on topics 
concerning the European region. Thirdly, 
the EU cooperates through its delegations 
with WHO country offices at the national 
level worldwide. 
The coordination among EU member 
states on WHO matters has been prepared 
by the EU delegation in Geneva since 2010. 
Despite some initial questions on legitima-
cy and trust, it is now clearly in the driving 
seat to bring across a common EU position 
between European countries on key issues. 
It is backed by the European Commissions’ 
Directorate-General for Health and Food 
Safety (DG SANTE) and the EEAS. However, 
the EU only has an observer status, as only 
nation-states can join WHO. This prevents 
the Union from fully participating in WHO 
governing body meetings. Hitherto, the EU 
has not made any attempts to change this. 
However, with the current global climate 
of retreat from multilateralism, there might 
be a window of opportunity for the EU to 
upgrade its status as well as that of other 
regional economic integration organisa-
tions. 
Despite various levels and areas of co-
operation and the EU’s observer status in 
WHO’s governing bodies, the EU and WHO 
partnership still feels shaky and less clari-
fied than it is for other partnerships between 
EU and UN institutions. The EU has, for 
instance, pushed for an enhanced observer 
status within the UN General Assembly 
(UNGA) that gives the Union, among others, 
the right to speak early in the debate of 
the UNGA and to be invited to the general 
debate. Furthermore, WHO is primarily 
considered a development organisation for 
public health standard-setting outside the 
EU. The COVID-19 pandemic may change 
this misconception for the better, since all 
countries are dependent on WHO recom-
mendations, followed by many – but not 
all – EU member states. 
The political support and increased joint 
action could strategically strengthen EU–
WHO cooperation at all levels by building 
on existing collaboration and partnership 
models (Figure 1). Three aspects are critical 
in the EU’s web of relations with WHO. 
Firstly, the European Commission does not 
have formal partnerships with regional 
WHO offices aside from WHO EURO, which 
Figure 1 
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could enable the EU to engage in global 
health diplomacy within and outside the 
European region. Secondly, the cooperation 
with WHO EURO seems to be primarily 
focused on European issues, which is un-
derstandable. However, the next program-
matic partnership between WHO EURO and 
the European Commission might therefore 
focus on global priorities that are equally 
important to both parties, such as projects 
about the environment and health, gender 
equity, and the commercial determinants 
of health. Thirdly, collaborative efforts 
between EU delegations with WHO country 
offices could be made more visible, coordi-
nated, and harmonised through shared learn-
ing and training sessions. 
The EU As a Geopolitical Actor in 
Global Health 
Commission President von der Leyen has 
expressed a willingness of the Commission 
to become more geopolitical, which could 
imply a more proactive and instrumental 
approach to multilateral organisations, 
but it also bears the risk of implying an 
EU-first bias. So far in the COVID-19 crisis, 
the EU has responded to the challenge of 
providing equitable access to vaccines, 
therapeutics, and diagnostics in three inter-
national fora. 
Firstly, in early May 2020, the EU organ-
ised an international pledging conference 
to raise funds for the development of vac-
cines, therapeutics, and diagnostics. Later, 
a second conference was organised. These 
conferences can be regarded as a double-
edged sword: On one side, they provide sup-
port for WHO’s goal to develop vaccines, 
therapeutics, and diagnostics as global pub-
lic goods – goods that should benefit every-
one equally. According to von der Leyen, 
the intention is not to distribute these 
exclusively among EU member states, but 
to make them available and affordable 
worldwide. On the other side, the confer-
ences position the European Commission 
and the EU as leaders for COVID-19 soli-
darity, thereby sidelining WHO as the main 
platform for global coordination on inter-
national health priorities. 
The EU pledging conferences are an 
example of “fast multilateralism”, but 
their focus is only on the development of 
vaccines, therapeutics, and diagnostics for 
one infectious pandemic disease, leaving 
other pressing health challenges neglected. 
Questions remain as to how more structural 
investment in and with WHO can be created 
to sustain global health multilateralism 
and create a sustainable impact on people’s 
health. 
Secondly, in the first ever virtual World 
Health Assembly (WHA) – the highest 
decision-making forum of WHO’s member 
states – the EU led the development of the 
main resolution, which focused exclusively 
on the response to the COVID-19 outbreak. 
Multilateral support for this resolution came 
from China and the EU leadership, but not 
from Russia, the United States, or India – 
with the latter having a large pharmaceu-
tical sector. The resolution includes four 
main features: the request for a broad UN 
response; a call to WHO member states to 
respect the International Health Regula-
tions, the internationally binding set of 
rules to prevent, detect, and respond to in-
fectious diseases; a call to international 
organisations to create a voluntary patent 
pool for the development of a COVID-19 
vaccine to ensure affordable access for all; 
and the request for WHO to establish an 
impartial, independent, and comprehensive 
evaluation of the coordinated international 
health response to COVID-19. 
The remuneration of pharmaceuticals 
is regulated by international patent law. 
However, since the global and simultaneous 
demand for COVID-19 diagnostics, vaccines, 
and therapeutics is so high, conventional 
patent licensing could make rapid devel-
opment and large-scale production difficult, 
which therefore could delay access and 
distribution of a vaccine. According to the 
resolution, a COVID-19 technology access 
pool should be the mechanism to remedy 
this challenge, ideally based on best prac-
tices; one example is the UNITAID-estab-
lished and supported Medicines Patent Pool. 
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However, the devil will be in the details, 
because the implementation of a patent 
pool requires internationally recognised 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Prop-
erty Rights (TRIPS) flexibilities by the EU 
and its member states. These flexibilities 
are not discussed at WHO, but at the World 
Trade Organization TRIPS Council, where 
South Africa recently pushed for initiating 
a resolution with the aim of simplifying 
the requirements for TRIPS flexibilities, 
including compulsory licensing of COVID-
19 diagnostics, therapeutics, and vaccines. 
This was proposed in order to legally guar-
antee access to diagnostics, therapeutics, 
and vaccines for COVID-19 as a global pub-
lic good, including in low-income countries. 
The compulsory licensing of medical prod-
ucts from pharmaceutical and biotech com-
panies can better protect public health and 
secure access to essential technologies. How-
ever, major pharma-producing countries, 
including from the EU, prioritise voluntary 
licensing and stress that the current market-
based system suffices to guarantee access 
in low- and middle-income countries. 
There seems to be a contradiction be-
tween the EU’s desire for global vaccine ac-
cessibility and EU member states’ commer-
cial interests and political will to protect 
patents, since a lifting of patent restrictions 
could create a potential precedent for other 
vaccines and medicines. EU member states 
prefer to keep control over the licensing of 
new medical products, and therefore they 
opt for voluntary licensing via a patent 
pool. In theory, this could still allow global 
access, but the international experience 
with gaining access to medicines for other 
diseases, such as HIV/AIDS and hepatitis C, 
would indicate otherwise. The COVID-19 
pandemic could potentially provide the 
momentum for reforming the governance 
of TRIPS flexibilities, which could have 
implications on whether universal access to 
medical products is allowed. The EU would 
benefit from this in the long term when 
considering both the economic and public 
health perspectives. 
Thirdly, WHO and the European Commis-
sion co-host an “Access to COVID-19 Tools 
accelerator” Facilitation Council (COVAX 
facility), a new multi-stakeholder platform 
that is intended to guide key strategic, 
policy, and financial issues during the 
development of new COVID-19 diagnostics, 
therapeutics, and vaccines – with commit-
ments by over 180 WHO member states. 
Still, parallel bilateral initiatives, such as 
advanced market commitments between 
the EU and pharmaceutical and biotech 
companies to secure doses of vaccines for 
European populations, might run against 
efforts within the COVAX facility to provide 
affordable vaccines for all, especially in low- 
and middle-income countries. However, the 
EU is now willing to engage in the COVAX 
facility after having advised its member 
states to not buy vaccines through COVAX 
earlier. 
What is still missing is an outspoken 
stance on how WHO should function with-
in the plethora of global health arrange-
ments (World Bank, GAVI, Global Fund, 
etc.) – vis-à-vis other powerful stakeholders 
such as philanthropic institutes and the 
pharmaceutical industry – as an independ-
ent watchdog during infectious disease out-
breaks (e.g. exposing cover-ups by states 
where an outbreak has started), as well as 
what its topics of focus should be and what 
organisational structure would be most 
adequate. In the lead-up to the announce-
ment about the US withdrawal from WHO 
in July 2021, Germany and France allegedly 
were discussing WHO reform with the US 
administration, which points to a recogni-
tion of the need for changes to the current 
set-up. However, it is not clear which av-
enues of reform the European Commission 
and EU member states prefer. By intensify-
ing cooperation with WHO, the European 
position on reform and the WHO reform 
process itself could be accelerated; despite 
WHO’s limitations, the pandemic has illus-
trated perhaps more than ever how much 
the organisation is needed. A non-paper 
presented by Germany and France gives 
some clues about the felt need for increased 
funding and a strengthening of the early 
warning and monitoring systems during 
epidemics and pandemics. But other issues, 
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such as the regional structure of WHO and 
its norm-setting function as well as global 
health aid and advice to developing coun-
tries, were not addressed. 
Future Choices for the EU on 
Global Health 
As the COVID-19 pandemic enters a pro-
longed phase, the EU and its member states 
are in the position to jointly contain the 
virus and begin to structurally recover by 
investing in the development of strong and 
resilient public health systems. To become 
a reliable and capable partner for WHO and 
beyond, the EU could strengthen its capac-
ities in the following areas. 
Firstly, the EU could update its Council 
Conclusions on global health. A new, co-
herent EU global health strategy should 
focus on facilitating resilient health systems 
that are rooted in sustainable development 
as well as the right to health, in addition to 
being prepared for external shocks such as 
health security risks and consequences of 
climate change. A new global health strat-
egy should offer a broad, more geopolitical, 
European perspective. Elements that could 
be included are references to the Union’s 
values (access to health, equality, democracy, 
accountability); links to the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs); a health focus 
in all policies; a bolstering of the imple-
mentation of the International Health 
Regulations; as well as reference to the EU’s 
strategic autonomy with regard to medical 
supplies and medicines (see also Kickbusch 
and Franz). 
New Council Conclusions should be 
accompanied by a concrete roadmap and 
monitoring mechanisms in order to be 
effective and transparent. Most important 
is that they be developed and owned by 
health, development, and foreign policy 
actors of the EU member states and insti-
tutions. Without their commitment, a 
recurrence of the 2010 Council Conclusions 
may happen when COVID-19 is behind us. 
Secondly, the EU needs to establish stra-
tegic global health capacities within EU 
institutions and across different sectors – 
including trade, energy, and the European 
Semester of economic and fiscal policy 
coordination – followed by a clear man-
date and solid financial global health 
resources. A strategic unit with financial, 
personnel, and thematic resources needs to 
be created within the EEAS that would have 
the mandate to coordinate several directo-
rates on global health matters. One Com-
missioner should clearly be responsible on 
global health vis-à-vis the European Parlia-
ment, the European Council, and individu-
al member states. This could either be the 
High Representative or the Health Commis-
sioner. The unit in the EEAS would have 
to collaborate closely with experts from the 
Commissions’ DG SANTE and could liaise 
with WHO and other multilateral partners 
more strategically. Moreover, it could also 
have a specific global health diplomacy 
function as well as active collaboration 
with EU delegations contributing to its for-
eign policy. 
Thirdly, the EU could strengthen its 
health competences domestically to be 
stronger abroad. Giving attention to, and 
linking, both the internal and external 
health dimensions of European policy, the 
EU could promote the internal strengthen-
ing of EU global and public health policy. 
The programme EU4Health 2021–2027, 
whose eventual budgetary allocation is still 
uncertain, should enhance European com-
petences and coordination by boosting the 
EU’s preparedness for major cross-border 
health threats, strengthening health sys-
tems across the EU in an equitable way, as 
well as providing agreement on a common 
vaccine policy. To complement this, the 
ECDC could be strengthened and given a 
more prominent role and mandate in the 
EU’s global health policy-making. It is im-
perative for the EU to become more strate-
gically autonomous with regard to medical 
supplies, but this should not be to the detri-
ment of global solidarity. 
Fourthly, the COVID-19 pandemic has 
also shown that EU member states have to 
act more coherently and in concert with EU 
institutions as well as during exchanges 
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with civil society actors to avoid duplicating 
and contradicting (global) health policies. 
Therefore, a space for communication, co-
ordination, and collaboration between EU 
institutions, EU member states, the Euro-
pean Parliament, and civil society actors 
has to be created in order to enhance the 
EU and member states’ abilities to perform 
more coherently on the international stage 
and within international partnerships, such 
as with WHO. The Global Health Policy 
Forum could be revived and upgraded for 
this purpose by broadening its functions as 
well as expanding membership to include 
the Council, the Parliament (aside from the 
Commission), the EEAS, and civil society 
actors. 
Lastly, the EU needs to establish a stra-
tegic global health budget to pursue an 
ambitious agenda that is financially backed. 
The various budgetary channels that are 
supporting global health policies should be 
harmonised, or at least mapped. This would 
offer an overview of European financial 
resources for global health, making them 
transparent for the European public and 
helping with the strategic decision-making 
as to which partnerships should be finan-
cially supported, depending on the global 
health issue. Support for WHO could then 
be much more targeted and in coherence 
with other partnerships. 
Recommendations 
To strengthen and deepen its cooperation 
with WHO, the EU needs to increase its 
work in the following areas: 
∎ Upgrade the EU’s status at WHO: The 
European Commission and EU member 
states should jointly ask for an upgrading 
of the EU’s status with WHO to increase 
the EU’s visibility as a powerful unified 
actor and to enable it to speak with one 
voice. This could be done either through 
a resolution, a special agreement, or by 
strengthening WHO’s representation at 
the EU in Brussels, which is already work-
ing not only on a European but on a 
global mandate. In a first step, the EU 
could strengthen the partnership by so-
lidifying the cooperation within a Mem-
orandum of Understanding that replaces 
the exchanging of letters. More and well-
coordinated meetings need to take place 
between senior representatives of WHO, 
the European Commission, and the 
EEAS. Consideration could be given to 
including representatives of EU member 
states to keep them engaged. 
∎ Extend the EU’s cooperation with 
WHO regional offices: A new roadmap 
for the partnership between WHO EURO 
and the European Commission is cur-
rently in the making. Now is the time 
for EU member states to have a strategic 
debate on WHO EURO and its future 
relations with the EU. New priorities 
and programmes should be aligned with 
achieving the SDGs – in Europe and 
globally. In line with the EU’s Green Deal 
objectives, projects with WHO promoting 
environment and health could equally 
pave the way for new areas of coopera-
tion. A solid monitoring mechanism for 
the new five-year plan is key to creating 
a sustainable impact as well as account-
ing for joint actions. The establishment 
of formal relations with WHO regional 
offices outside of Europe, such as WHO 
AFRO, would put EU efforts at the coun-
try level within a broader synergistic and 
strategic approach. 
∎ Increase and sustain WHO’s budget: 
WHO’s financing is mainly based on in-
dividual donor interests, leaving WHO 
highly dependent and vulnerable to the 
top 15 donors, which contribute more 
than 80 per cent of all voluntary contri-
butions. An increase of assessed and core 
voluntary contributions, as demanded by 
many experts as well as governments, is 
necessary to ensure WHO’s ability to act 
on its core functions. Financially, the an-
nounced US withdrawal could be partly 
compensated for by the EU, but the EU 
should also work for sustainable financ-
ing and reform of WHO, including en-
suring autonomy and the global public 
legitimacy of the organisation. Sustain-
able and long-term predictable financing 
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leads to sustainable human resources 
planning with staff that can implement 
reforms and deliver what is demanded 
of WHO. 
∎ Consider WHO recommendations and 
the results of the Independent Panel for 
Pandemic Preparedness and Response 
(IPPR): A high level of political support 
for WHO can be shown by applying 
WHO norms and standards at home as 
well as in international global arrange-
ments. This should include unequivocal 
financial support by the EU and its mem-
ber states for – as well as the commit-
ment to – WHO’s COVAX facility. WHO’s 
role in global health can also be strength-
ened by referring to and promoting 
WHO’s role as the supreme global health 
authority. Based on the WHA resolution, 
WHO has established the IPPR, which 
evaluates the global COVID-19 response. 
This initiative is strongly supported by 
the EU and its member states and can, as 
an indirect effect, potentially defuse some 
of the geopolitical tensions around the 
global governance of the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The IPPR was launched in July 
2020 and is co-chaired by former Prime 
Minister of New Zealand Helen Clark and 
former President of Liberia Ellen Johnson 
Sirleaf. An interim report to the WHA is 
expected in November 2020. European 
countries need to properly consider the 
results of the independent evaluation and 
further strengthen the autonomy of 
WHO. 
∎ Lead the WHO reform debates: The 
EU should have the ambition to reshape 
multilateral global health structures 
while establishing WHO at the centre. 
The EU should provide voice and leader-
ship in an institutional and legitimate 
reform process of WHO, which was slow 
and ineffective before the COVID-19 pan-
demic. The German–French non-paper 
already provides relevant proposals. 
∎ Develop a new EU global health strat-
egy that addresses WHO reform and 
is backed by health, development, and 
foreign affairs stakeholders from EU 
institutions and member states. Such 
a global health strategy should include 
issues regarding WHO’s raison d’être, its 
current organisational structure, areas 
of focus, and independence during out-
breaks of infectious diseases. It should 
also make choices about, or create a bal-
ance between, the EU’s desire to uphold 
multilateral arrangements and simul-
taneously become more strategically 
autonomous. 
A renewed partnership between the EU 
and WHO during the COVID-19 pandemic – 
despite nationalistic trends and geopolitical 
tensions – offers a glimmer of hope. The 
EU should seize on this opportunity but 
not outshine WHO, as collective efforts are 
needed more than ever to secure global 
public goods and uphold the international 
health order. 
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